Unfortunately, while this is a wonderful idea in a world of academia, nonprofits, and gentlemens' agreements, it's becoming obvious that in the real world of money, greed, bad actors, lawyers, and intellectual property land grabs that it really isn't a very good system at all. Frankly, it's pretty terrible.
A recent, very high-profile case concerned etoys.com, which, despite being created years after an artist's collective called etoy.org (note no "s"), attempted to strip etoy.org of its domain name. Current IP-resolution policies at NSI and ICANN aided and abetted this behavior; etoy.org lost its longstanding domain name essentially instantly, and nothing but a frankly amazing PR compaign (and media support) succeeded in changing etoys.com's mind about the issue. (If etoys.com had not relented, etoy.org would still be without its domain name.)
There are any number of other bad examples, most of which never make the press in the first place. In addition, such land grabs lead to very rapid exhaustion of the DNS namespace -- NSI encourages everyone to grab 3 domain names at once (.com, .net, .org), and why not? NSI will make three times as much money registering them. Finally, the land-grab mentality has lead to preemptive grabs of just about every single word in the English language, mostly by squatters hoping to sell those names to the highest bidder.
The current situation is encouraging land grabs for two reasons:
So we have a situation in which everyone is suing everyone else, the address space has been exhausted in a very short amount of time, and nobody is having any fun.
Political chokepoint. The DNS is currently serving as one of the most important political pinch-points on the net because it gives those with an axe to grind a central place to exert political pressure. If what comes out of your domain is sufficiently unpopular with the local government, it can probably arrange to get your domain name mapping yanked. Furthermore, it gives unwarranted authority to domain name registrars to dictate what a name may be. (For example, NSI has for years had a set of undocumented and inconsistent rules about names -- often, they can't be "obscene," in the capricious and unappealable eyes of NSI, but many exceptions appear to have slipped through the cracks. NSI also enforces rather draconian length limits -- on the order of 25 characters or so -- even though the DNS technical specs allow 256. Now that other registrars have finally been allowed to appear, these restrictions may go away -- or we may see a random patchwork of other restrictions, or even a lowest-common-denominator subset of the most restrictive policies of the biggest registrars. Anything's possible.)
Little guys. Despite all this, what happens when you're trying to find the Acme Hardware store just down the street? Unless they're affiliated with a national brand, and unless they have a store locator, you'll never figure out what their domain name is -- there are just too many other Acme's, and no obvious way to pick out the one you wanted. If you actually want to use geographical information to help find a local entity, the situation can be grim, even if the site you're looking for mentions their location in their web pages. A few search engines can sometimes help, but for the average end-user, the domain might as well not exist. Why are search engines not the answer?
Anonymity. Sometimes it's desireable to be able to say things anonymously. The authors of the Federalist Papers, back around the time of the US Revolution, published many of their political tracts anonymously. Yet domain names, by virtue of their hierarchical arrangement, are easily traceable back to someone higher in the tree who is, by definition, "responsible" for the delegation farther down the tree -- and who can often be pressured to revoke the delegation, therefore effectively seizing control of the domain name and shutting it down. Thus, it's essentially impossible to protect a domain name from retribution while simultaneously advertising its existence to potential correspondents. (Of course, it's also difficult to hide how packets get routed to and from a domain name -- and hence one's upstream packet provider may also be a point of political pressure -- but it is easier to change packet routing providers than it is to change a domain name, precisely because changing packet routing is not something that end-users see, while changing a domain name requires notifying everyone who knew the old one what the new one is.)
Thus, freedom of expression has been greatly compromised by the existing DNS. Being unable to publish anonymously online means that the online world has deprived US citizens of a right that has been repeatedly upheld by courts in the real world. CFP isn't just about privacy -- it's also about other freedoms, such as freedom of speech.
Anonymous speech about unpopular subjects is thus often limited to getting an account on someone else's system (e.g., Hotmail, etc) who is large enough that you won't be noticed, and important enough that no one will turn off their domain just because of you. And you'd better pick a free service, since otherwise following the money will expose you. Certain solutions have been proposed for the special case of publishing (such as the Freedom Project), but this is only a partial solution.
The fundamentally-anarchic polity which influenced the early design of the Internet is, alas, fundamentally incompatible with any global namespace. Why is this so? Because global namespaces require enforcement against duplication. So the first principle of a new naming system is to permit duplication of names. This is, after all, how names in the real world operate -- very few people or businesses have globally unique names. Instead, they are disambiguated locally, using several methods (geography, profession [for people] or market segment [for businesses], etc), while remaining globally ambiguous.
If we do this, then the hierarchy that is fundamental to the old DNS -- established precisely so that searches were fast and duplication was impossible -- is no longer strictly necessary. So get rid of it.
Therefore, design a name system which encourages this proliferation of names. Resolution of conflicts becomes important, as well as the principle that some names won't be resolvable. This principle of irresolution is in fact the main privacy protection in such a system. This kind of naming system foundationally must support private name systems. The enforceability of the privacy of a private group of names become a central technical question.
Clearly, since we are disambiguating names locally, we expect that computers that are "nearby" each other in some way are probably engaging in a collaborative dialog to determine what a name "means" to a user and in the local neighborhood of machines.
So we can probably plan on a few megabytes of persistent storage in each computer to hold the (necessarily dynamic) representation of local relationships. This capacity constraint led to the centralization present in DNS. This constraint is no longer with us, and any successor system should feel free to break with that tradition of paucity. In addition, once a name is resolved, the changes are probably very high that the same name in the future should be resolved the same way -- we should cache the results locally, both to help the local machine and probably to help neighbors which might need to determine the same thing.
The resulting system might look like a patchwork of cached information about relationships between clusters of machines. Within a patch, resolution might be very fast and require very little addition information. Across a patch, something like a negotiation may be required -- followed by some cached information which (a) might tend to merge the patch (or not), and which (b) might look something like a treaty or a trade agreement, implemented at network speeds and maintained as names change and hosts move by the caches managed by the cooperating machines.
We should also plan some extensions to the user interface, since users may have a pretty good idea of how to disambiguate a reference (they may know the geographic location, etc, of the name they just typed in). Exactly what form this takes is a big question and depends a lot on how the rest of the system is implemented.
We also want to give users the ability to manipulate these mappings -- after all, if names are no longer globally unique, every user and every machine should feel free to invent any number of names in any way they want, somehow including resolving additional information that may help to disambiguate the name later. We have now empowered random end-users, effectively, to be able to register any number of domain names, for free.
We might want to ensure that any two identically-named, but different, SmooshNames can be told apart from each other, even if we don't know which one is the one the user wanted. Each one could have a unique 256-bit random bitstring associated with it, for example. (Relying on this, and not IPv4 32-bit addresses, or even IPv6 128-bit addresses, allows SmooshNames to change the mapping information that they're being used for without losing their identity if this information is changed.) So I can change my IP address (perhaps dynamically, every time I connect, via DHCP), but people who already know my SmooshName aren't affected by this.
Finding an individual
Sally Smith tells Harry Jones her SmooshName -- let's say it's just SallySmith. (This is like a domain name, but since we're getting rid of the domain name system, we need new kinds of names.) It's just her personal website, and she's just a normal person. In particular, this probably means:
On the other hand, Sally gave Harry her SmooshName for a reason. Probably they're friends, or have friends or business acquaintances in common, or Harry knows some other disambiguating information about her.
So Harry tells his machine to connect to the SallySmith SmooshName. If this were the old, bad world of the DNS, he'd need more structure in that name -- that's not a top-level domain. And if he had it, his machine would (in essence) start at the DNS root and walk down a hierarchical namespace until it found it. But this is the new world of Smoosh, so instead Harry's machine engages in a series of dialogs with machines it's already talked to in the past. It sends out a limited range broadcast (which dies out after 5 or 10 hops) asking everyone it knows to (a) spread the broadcast (within that limited diameter) and (b) answer if they're ever heard of SallySmith. Since Harry and Sally share some human connections in common, chances are their respective machines do, too.
Harry's machine gets back 5 matches for SallySmith. Four of them are the same SmooshName (because it's got the same 256-bit random number associated with it, say), and one isn't. Chances are, those four that are the same are likely to be the right SallySmith, but only if she's more popular with the set of Harry and Sally's friends than, say, some large business coincidentally called SallySmith that they all do business with. We're assuming that everybody's machine is already connected via high-speed links (should be true enough by the time Smoosh could possibly be deployed), and so this whole process just took about 3 seconds or so. (Besides, if machines are constantly propagating updates, Harry's machine might already have had most or all of the information it needed without making a broadcast at all.)
Harry's machine presents him with the choices, including a little graphical map of the various connections it was able to divine about who knows SallySmith, and Harry makes a choice. Making this choice binds an IP address to the SmooshName on Harry's machine, which then caches that information and contacts Sally's machine using normal IP routing mechanisms. If Harry discovers that he guessed wrong, he tells his machine, which unbinds that cached IP address and tries another choice. If the choice was right, Harry's machine remembers the information permanently (across boots).
This process was definitely interactive -- Harry didn't just type in a hostname and be done with it. On the other hand, it was probably faster, easier, and more likely to be successful than if Harry had to try several search engines, name-lookup services, and so forth, to find Sally's domain. Obviously, Sally could have just given Harry an already-disambiguated, old-style domain name -- but chances are she would have had to give him a name like SallySmith254237 because there are so many other people with her name and because all the good words are taken. Doing that would have meant he had to write it down -- and woe be to him if he loses that scrap of paper -- the current DNS makes recovering this information much harder than calling 411 to recover a forgotten (but listed) phone number.
Creating some entries
When Sally wanted to create her SallySmith SmooshName, she simply told one of her computers about it. It propagated this information to most of the machines she's talked to in the past, and continues to do so in the future. Now, it becomes fairly easy for people who are "near" Sally in social connection space to figure out her IP address from her SmooshName. She can create any number of these names. If she chooses names are are particularly already likely to have been used by others (such as just "Sally"), well, she's making life harder for people who might like to use that SmooshName, because they're going to get lots more choices when it comes time to disambiguate. But they'll still be able to find her. And if they know she's got lots of related SmooshNames, they can tell their machines, "Use the Sally SN that's associated with the SallySmith SN you already know." So now Sally can hand out a variety of related names, perhaps one each for her large flock of machines, and people can still find individual machines with very few choices having to be made.
Joe wants to hand out anonymous leaflets. He can do this on the street corner, but life is more difficult online. He doesn't want to use Blacknet or otherwise spam the world, but he wants to make sure that his pamphlets are nonetheless available for people who come looking for them -- without necessarily tying his pamphlets to a particular sponsoring organization.
In the old, DNS world, this would be tricky. He might be able to use something like Freenet, but only if he doesn't care about being able to later talk with people who read his stuff (Freenet is only a publishing medium). And simply putting up his web pages might get him in trouble. After all, if AOL doesn't like them, they'll remove them. And if he puts his pages up at his company's web pages, (a) they might disapprove and fire him, and (b) the very fact that Joe's domain name is in the authority hierarchy of his employer makes an implicit statement that the employer has something to do with the webpages. This is not what Joe wants, and also strips him of a lot of his potential anonymity.
So instead, Joe makes a SmooshName called Pamphleteer. (He could have chosen Anonymous, but that's likely to be very common and just makes life difficult for others who want to disambiguate the name, by giving them too many choices.) He tells his machine to advertise the name. Now, anyone who is "nearby" in social space can find that mchine. The name is no longer associated with any particular company or ISP, so many of the implicit statements there were being made by that name are gone.
Of course, it's hard for Joe to spread his message both anonymously and widely, because there are probably a lot of Pamphleteers, and so if he sends a message to a big newsgroup or mailing list giving people that name, it may take them a while to find him. On the other hand, he has some choices:
Note that, once Joe's IP address is discovered, he's lost some anonymity because where that points can tell you a lot about who Joe might be. On the other hand, (a) Joe could simply keep changing IP addresses [his readers would never know], (b) Joe could have one of a zillion mostly-anonymous [and probably dynamic] addresses on a big hosting service, (c) Joe could be using one (or several) addresses at friends, sponsors, etc, but still not necessary reveal all of this up-front and permanently by advertising it in his domain name, or (d) the IP address that is looked up could be an explicitly-anonymous hosting service run by someone else -- and if Joe becomes unhappy with them, he just changes which one he uses, again without having to change his SmooshName in any way. SmooshNames, because they don't address routing, thus don't solve all anonymity problems -- they just solve their own piece and make anonymity a little bit easier.
A word about these scenarios
These are all very sketchy. A huge number of implementation and operational details have been omitted, and it's not even clear that even the outlines of this mechanism are the right ones. But hopefully these scenarios have given the barest taste of how this mechanism might work in practice.
Lenny Foner Last modified: Thu Apr 13 18:14:55 EDT 2000